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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
WORKING ON THE RAILROAD: THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT 
ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY DRUG AND 
ALCOHOL TESTING OF RAILROAD 
WORKERS IN RAILWAY LABOR 
EXECUTIVES' ASS'N v. BURNLEY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnleyl the Ninth 
Circuit held that Federal Railroad Administration regulations 
authorizing employee blood, urine and breath tests after speci-
fied train accidents, fatal incidents and rule violations violated 
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2 The court 
held that "intrusive drug and alcohol testing may be required or 
authorized only when specific articulable facts give rise to a rea-
sonable suspicion that a test will reveal evidence of current drug 
or alcohol impairment."3 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the administrative search 
exception for closely regulated industries did not apply to blood, 
urine and breath testing of railroad workers and concluded that 
particularized suspicion is required to insure the reasonableness 
of post-accident drug and alcohol testing.' 
1. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.) (per Tang, J.; the other panel members were Pregerson, J., 
and Alarcon, J., dissenting), cert. granted 108 S.Ct. 2033 (1988). 
2. [d. at 577. 
3. [d. at 592. 
4. [d. The court also considered RLEA's arguments that the regulations violated the 
equal protection and due process clauses of the United States Constitution and various 
federal statutes. [d. at 590-92. Finding little merit in these arguments, the Ninth Circuit 
extensively analyzed the regulations mandating or authorizing drug and alcohol testing 
under the Fourth Amendment. See infra note 188 (discussion of plaintiff's other argu-
1 
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II. FACTS 
On August 2, 1985, the Federal Railroad Administration is-
sued regulations permitting private railroads to test covered em-
ployees for current drug and alcohol use,& The Railroad Labor 
Executives' Association (RLEA) objected to the new regulations 
and was able to delay their implementation for approximately 
six months,S The regulations went into effect February 10, 1986,7 
The RLEA's principal contention was that the regulations 
violated railroad workers' Fourth Amendment rights, RLEA ob-
jected to subparts C and D of the regulations,S Subpart C man-
ments and the court's analysis of them). 
5. The regulations were codified in DOT Control of Alcohol and Drug Use, 49 C.F.R. 
Part 219 (1987). 
6. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1988). 
The Railway Labor Executives' Association [hereinafter RLEA) had been a party to the 
rule making process. [d. Disagreeing with the provisions regarding post-accident toxico-
logical testing, RLEA filed a petition for reconsideration that was denied by the Secre-
tary of Transportation. [d. RLEA then brought suit in federal district court and received 
a temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting the implementation of the regulations. 
[d. The TRO remained in effect until the district court granted summary judgment for 
the government. Id. RLEA obtained a stay from the Ninth Circuit, pending appeal, but 
the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the stay. Dole v. RLEA, 474 U.S. 1099 (1986). 
7. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 577. 
8. DOT Control of Alcohol and Drug Use, 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.201 and 301 (1987). 49 
C.F.R. § 219.201 (1987) sets out the following as the events that trigger mandatory test-
ing without suspicion: 
219.201 Events for which testing is required. 
(a) List of events. On and after March 10, 1986, except as pro-
vided in paragraph (b) of this section, post-accident toxicolog-
ical tests shall be conducted after any event that involves one 
or more of the circumstances described in paragraphs (a)(l) 
through (3) of this section: 
(1) Major train accident. Any train accident that involves 
one or more of the following: 
(i) A fatality; 
(ii) Release of a hazardous material accompanied by-
(A) An evacuation; or 
(B) A reportable injury resulting from the hazardous ma-
terial release (e.g., from fire, explosion, inhalation, or skin con-
tact with the material); or 
(iii) Damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more. 
(2) Impact accident. An impact accident resulting in-
(i) A reportable injury; or 
(ii) Damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more. 
(3) Fatal train incident. Any train incident that involves a 
fatality to anyon-duty railroad employee. 
(b) Exception. No test shall be required in the case of a 
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dates alcohol and drug testing of all covered employees directly 
involved in major train accidents,9 impact accidents/o or fatal 
train incidents.ll The regulations require that blood and urine 
samples be taken from all covered employees directly involved 
in such accidents as soon as possible following an accident. l2 
Blood samples are to be taken at independent medical facili-
ties. ls Refusal to provide a sample results in a nine-month pe-
riod of disqualification from work.14 
Subpart D authorizes railroads to require covered employ-
ees to submit to breath or urine tests when a supervisor has a 
reasonable suspicion that an employee is under the influence of 
or impaired by alcohol or drugs. IIi To require a urinalysis, two 
supervisors must have reasonable suspicion that the employee is 
currently under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and if drug use 
is suspected, one of the supervisors must have received training 
in spotting drug use. lS The railroads are also given the authority 
under Subpart D to test when an employee is involved in an 
accident or incident that must be reported under 49 C.F.R. Part 
collision between railroad rolling stock and a motor vehicle or 
other highway conveyance at a raillhighway grade crossing. 
9. 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.201(a)(l)(i-iii) (1986). A major train accident for the purposes of 
the regulation involves a fatality; 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(I)(i), a release of a hazardous 
material accompanied by an evacuation or reportable injury 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(l)(ii); 
or damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(l)(iii). 
10. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(2) (1987). See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
11. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(3) (1987). See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
12. 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(b) (1986) states the following: "The railroad shall make 
every reaonable effort to assure that samples are provided as soon as possible after the 
accident or incident." 
13. 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(c)(l) (1986) states the following: "Employees shall be trans-
ported to an independent medical facility where the samples shall be obtained. In all 
cases blood shall be drawn only by a qualified medical professional or by a qualified 
technician subject to the supervision of a qualified medical professional." 
14. 49 C.F.R. § 219.213(a)(l) (1986) states the following: "An employee who refuses 
to cooperate in providing a blood or urine sample following an accident or incident speci-
fied in this section shall be withdrawn from covered service and shall be deemed disqual-
ified for covered service for a period of nine (9) months." 
15. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301 (1986). Under this section, workers are subject to breath 
tests when a supervisory employee has a reasonable suspicion that the employee is cur-
rently under the influence or impaired by alcohol, or alcohol in combination with drugs. 
The supervisory employee's suspicion must be based upon specific, personal observations 
that can be articulated. See § 219.301(b)(I). 
In addition to breath testing based on reasonable suspicion of alcohol use, such test-
ing can be predicated upon a supervisor's suspicion that an employee's actions caused an 
accident, incident or rule violation. See also § 219.301(b)(2). 
16. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2)(i) (1986). 
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225/7 and a supervisor has reasonable suspicion that the em-
ployee's acts or omissions contributed to the accident. IS The 
railroads may also test when a covered employee has violated 
certain railroad operating rules. IS 
The only factual dispute in this case concerned the extent 
of drug and alcohol abuse in the railroad industry.2o The record 
adopted21 by the Ninth Circuit showed that accidents or inci-
dents involving drug or alcohol abuse by railroad workers com-
prised 4.7 percent of the total accidents between 1975 and 
1984.22 The government argued that the 4.7 percent figure was 
lower than it should be because of underreporting by the indus-
try.23 The government further argued that the transportation of 
hazardous materials and the pervasiveness of drug and alcohol 
use in society made the use of drugs and alcohol by railroad em-
ployees a serious national concern.1I4 The plaintiff RLEA con-
ceded that the problem was serious.211 
The Ninth Circuit's principal task was to determine the 
constitutionality of the drug and alcohol testing scheme under 
the Fourth Amendment.lIs 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. WHAT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
protects the individual from unreasonable governmental 
17. 49 C.F.R. § 225.5(b) (1987). Under this section, an accident/incident is defined 
as (1) any impact between on-track train equipment and a motor vehicle, bicycle, farm 
vehicle or a pedestrian at a rail-highway grade crossing; (2) any collision, derailment, fire, 
explosion, act of God, or other event involving operation of railroad equimpment that 
results in more than $5,200 in damages to on-track equipment, etc.; and (3) any event 
which results in the death of one or more persons, or injury to employees or other per-
sons that requires medical treatment. 
18. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(2) (1986). 
19. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(3) (1986). 
20. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 579. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. at 592. (Alarcon, J., dissenting) 
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searches and seizures.27 The Supreme Court has noted that the 
"overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect per-
sonal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the 
State."28 
In deciding whether the Fourth Amendment applies, courts 
analyze whether a search has taken place and whether there has 
been sufficient government involvement to subject the actions to 
the limits of the amendment.29 Generally, a search occurs when 
a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy" is invaded.80 A 
reasonable expectation of privacy is one that "soCiety is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "81 
Government involvement sufficient to trigger the Fourth 
Amendment's protection occurs when the government partici-
pates in a significant way in a total course of conduct leading to 
a search.82 The determining factor is the actual participation of 
a government official in the initiation of a search.88 
B. ALCOHOL AND DRUG TESTING AS SEARCHES 
Blood tests,84 urine tests,811 and breath tests86 have been de-
27. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend IV. See generally, W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987). [Hereinafter LAFAVE] 
28. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). See infra note 44. 
29. Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). In Katz, the issue before the 
Supreme Court was the admissibility of evidence of a telephone conversation gathered 
through the use of an electonic "bug" attached to the outside of a telephone booth. Id. at 
349 The Court held that the warrantless search was unconstitutional because the search 
violated Katz's reasonable expectation that his conversation in the public telephone 
booth would be private. Id. at 353. 
31. Id. at 361. 
32. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 581 (quoting United States v. Davis, 492 F.2d 983, 897 (9th 
Cir. 1973». 
33. Id. (paraphrasing Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949». 
34. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 767. See infra note 44. 
35. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987). In this case, 
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termined to be searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. To determine the reasonableness of the bodily intrusion 
involved with the three types of tests, courts have applied differ-
ent standards.37 
1. General Warrant Requirement 
The traditional rule of reasonableness is that "[E]xcept in 
certain carefully defined classes,"38 a search is unreasonable un-
less it has been authorized by a search warrant.39 Because the 
Fourth Amendment demands that "no warrant shall issue, but 
upon probable cause .... "40 the general rule requires a warrant 
supported by probable cause41 for a search to be reasonable.42 
2. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
In general, the requirement of a warrant has been dispensed 
with when "special need, beyond the normal need for law en-
the Eighth Circuit was faced with the issue of the constitutionality of a Department of 
Correction rule that mandated random or reasonable suspicion-based urinalysis of cor-
rections officers. Id. at 1304. The court held that the urinalysis was constitutional be-
cause the government interest in prison security outweighed the diminished privacy in-
terests of the officers. Id. at 1308. 
36. See, e.g., Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
37. The traditional standard of reasonableness demands a warrant supported by 
probable cause. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct 1492, 1499-1501 (1987). An excep-
tion to the warrant requirement is found when "special needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable." 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985), (Blackmun, J., concurring.) 
38. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). 
39.Id. 
40. U.S. Const. amend IV. See supra, note 27. 
41. Probable cause has been said to exist "when known facts and circumstances are 
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that an offense has been 
or is being committed." United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In 
Davis, two police officers saw a man talking with a group of men exhibiting traits symp-
tomatic of drug addiction. Id. at 820. The officers subsequently saw the man approach a 
very well-dressed man, and conduct a furtive transaction in which the defendant slid the 
well-dressed man money, and received a brown package in return. Id. The officers ar-
rested both men and found heroin. Id. at 820-21. The D.C. Circuit held that probable 
cause to arrest existed because of the "total circumstances, judged in light of the officer's 
experience." Id. at 822. 
42. See, O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct 1492 (1987). In O'Connor, the Supreme Court 
held that the constitutionality of a search of a state hospital employee's office should be 
judged by a standard of reasonableness under all of the circumstances. Under this stan-
dard, both the inception and scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. Id. at 724. 
6
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forcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement 
impracticable. "43 
The exceptions to the general rule requiring a warrant con-
sidered relevant by the Ninth Circuit were; (1) compelled blood 
tests in drunk driving arrests," (2) the administrative inspection 
of closely regulated industries,46 (3) the search by public em-
ployers of government workers for work-related purposes and for 
investigations of work-related misconduct,46 and (4) searches of 
schoolchildren, where the requirement of obtaining a warrant 
would hinder the administrator's ability to preserve school 
discipline.47 
a. Blood Tests in Drunk Driving Arrests 
In Schmerber v. California,48 the Supreme Court considered 
the constitutionality of a warrantless blood test given incident to 
a drunk driving arrest. The Court determined that because of 
the rapidity with which the percentage of alcohol diminished in 
the blood stream,49 an officer's ability to test for the presence of 
alcohol in the blood should not be burdened with the require-
ment of obtaining a warrant. No warrant is necessary if reasona-
ble methods are used, there is probable cause to believe that evi-
dence of intoxication will be found, and there are exigent 
43. New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). 
44. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber was in an auto crash 
and had been taken to a hospital for treatment. Id. at 758. At the hospital, a police 
officer saw signs of drunkenness and arrested Schmerber. Id. at 769. The officer ordered 
a blood test to find evidence of intoxication. Id. at 758. The Supreme Court found that 
despite the lack of an authorizing search warrant, the search was reasonable because it 
was conducted incident to a valid arrest and because delaying the procedure would have 
probably resulted in the loss of the evidence. Id. at 769-72. 
45. New York v. Burger, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987). ct. note 37, supra. In this case, a 
junkyard owner challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute authorizing the 
warrantless inspection of junkyards. Id. at 2649. The Supreme Court held that the stat-
ute was constitutional because the search fell within the closely regulated industry ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 2648-49. 
46. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987). See supra, note 42. 
47. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). In this case the Court was faced 
with the constitutionality of a warrantless search of a student's purse by the school prin-
cipal. Id. at 328. The Court held that neither a warrant nor probable cause was required, 
and that the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances standard. Id. 
at 341. 
48. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
49. [d. at 770-71. 
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circumstances making it impractical to obtain a search warrant 
beforehand.llo 
b. The Closely Regulated Industry Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement 
In New York v. Burger,III the most recent case to discuss the 
closely regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement, 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that such a search is reasonable 
when the following three criteria are met; (1) a "substantial" 
government interest underlies the regulatory scheme; (2) war-
rantless inspections are necessary to fulfill the regulatory 
scheme; and (3) the inspection program, in terms of the cer-
tainty and regularity of its application, must provide a constitu-
tionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Ill! 
The administrative search of closely regulated industries ex-
ception to the warrant requirment developed principally from 
three decisions. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States liS 
the Supreme Court held that inspections of liquor establish-
ments by federal agents did not require a warrant because the 
liquor industry had a history of close regulationll4 and Congress 
had the power to set the standards of reasonableness regarding 
the searches of such industries.1I1I 
In United States v. Biswell,1I6 the Supreme Court held that 
the federal government's need to regulate the interstate trans-
portation of firearms justified statutes allowing the warrantless 
inspection of firearms businesses.1I7 The Court stated the ration-
ale of this exception to the warrant requirement: ". . . if inspec-
50.Id. 
51. New York v. Burger, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987). 
52. Id. at 2644. 
53. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). In this case, the 
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a warrant was necessary to search the prem-
ises of a liquor dealer. Id. at 74. The Court held that because the liquor industry had a 
history of close regulation, Congress had broad powers to determine the standard of rea-
sonableness applicable to searches of the premises of those businesses, and therefore a 
warrant would not necessarily be required. Id. at 77. 
54.Id. 
55.Id. 
56. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
57. Id. at 315-16. 
8
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tion is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unan-
nounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this 
context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate 
inspection. . . . "Ci8 
The third case underpinning the closely regulated industry 
exception, Donovan v. Dewey,Ci9 involved the warrantless inspec-
tion of coal mines. Faced with the constitutionality under the 
Fourth Amendment of federal statutes authorizing warrantless 
searches of coal mines,80 the Supreme Court held that the sub-
stantial government interest in regulating the safety of the na-
tion's mines would be frustrated by the requirement of a search 
warrant.81 The Court also found the warrantless searches reason-
able in scope because of the certain limits on the ability of offi-
cials to search.62 
When an industry is not the object of pervasive government 
regulation, government inspectors are required to obtain a war-
rant, but the standard of probable cause necessary to justify the 
issuance of the warrant is lower than the traditional probable 
cause standard.63 Using the standard developed in Camara v. 
Municipal Court,64 inspection warrants can be obtained "if a 
reasonable legislative or administrative standard"6Ci exists. 
The closely regulated industry exception to the warrant re-
quirement was used by the Third Circuit in Shoemaker v. Han-
del66 to justify warrantless breath and urine testing of jockeys in 
the horse racing industry.87 The Third Circuit was faced with 
58. [d. at 316. 
59. 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
60. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1986). 
61. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 
(1972)). 
62. [d. 
63. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). In this case, the Supreme 
Court held that while traditional probable cause is not required for a warrant to inspect 
commercial premises, specific neutral criteria are required for the issuance of the search 
warrant. [d. at 323. See also, LAFAVE, supra note 27, § 10.2(a) (2d ed. 1987). 
64. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
65. [d. at 539-40. In this case the Supreme Court held that San Francisco building 
inspectors were required to obtain a warrant before searching premises for violations of 
the Housing Code. [d. at 540. The Supreme Court noted that such warrants could issue 
under a reasonable administrative standard. [d. at 538. 
66. 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986). 
67. [d. at 1142. 
9
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the question of the constitutionality of regulations promulgated 
by the New Jersey Racing Commission that permitted an official 
to require breath and urine testing of any official, jockey, groom 
or trainer.B8 The court reasoned that for the closely regulated 
industry exception to apply there must be a strong state interest 
in conducting an unannounced search, and the pervasive regula-
tion of the industry must have lowered the justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy of the subject of the search.B9 The court found 
that New Jersey's interest in "assuring the public of the integ-
rity of the persons engaged in the horse racing industry"70 was 
strong enough to meet the first requirement, and that the second 
requirement was met because the history of regulation of the in-
dustry had lowered the justifiable expectations of privacy of per-
sons working in that industry.71 
The Eighth Circuit applied the Shoemaker court's reason-
ing to the question of the Fourth Amendment constitutionality 
of rules requiring the random urinalysis of prison guards.72 The 
Eighth Circuit found the institutional interest in security to be a 
strong state interest73 and urinalysis to be a reasonable intrusion 
into the guards' expectations of privacy.H 
In Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District,76 a U.S. Dis-
trict Court adopted the two-prong test set out in Shoemaker v. 
Handel.7B Considering the Fourth Amendment constitutionality 
of a program of drug and alcohol testing of employees permitted 
unescorted access to protected areas of a nuclear power plant, 
the district court concluded that a warrantless testing scheme 
was justified when "a strong state interest exists in conducting 
an unannounced search and the pervasive regulation of the in-
dustry has reduced the justifiable privacy expectation of the in-
dividual searched."77 
68. [d. at 1138-41. 
69. [d. at 1142. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. 
72. McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987). See supra note 35 for a 
discussion of this case. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. 653 F.Supp. 15lO (D.Neb. 1987). 
76. 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986). 
77. Rushton, 653 F.Supp. 1524. 
10
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3. The Balancing Test of Reasonableness Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
The standard of reasonableness that applies to a category of 
searches is determined by balancing the type and level of intru-
sion on an individual's Fourth Amendment right to privacy 
against the importance of the government interest that moti-
vates the search.78 In the case of police searches to gather infor-
mation for criminal prosecution, the standard of reasonableness 
is a warrant supported by probable cause, or in certain circum-
stances, probable cause alone.79 
In administrative and business contexts, courts apply the 
balancing test of reasonableness first set out by the Supreme 
Court in Camara v. Municipal Court.80 In Camara, the Court 
considered whether a warrantless search of housing by city hous-
ing inspectors violated the Fourth Amendment.81 After deciding 
that such administrative searches did require a warrant to be 
reasonable,82 the Court considered the question of the type of 
probable cause required before such a warrant could be issued.83 
In order to decide the type of probable cause required, the 
Supreme Court first considered whether area inspections of 
housing are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.84 The 
only test of reasonableness that the court found was "balancing 
the need to search against the invasion that the search en-
tails. "85 The court stressed that three important factors should 
be considered in determining the reasonableness of such inspec-
tions: (1) a strong public interest in maximum effectiveness in 
combatting the problem at hand ... ; (2) an inability to achieve 
acceptable results by following the usual probable cause limita-
tion ... ; and (3) the relatively limited invasion of the ... citi-
zen's privacy.86 
78. Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 586 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
79. See LAFAVE, supra note 27, §§ 3.1, et seq. 
80. Camara, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
81. Id. at 525. 
82. Id. at 534. 
83.Id. 
84. Id. at 537. 
85. [d. at 537. 
86.Id. 
11
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Having concluded that such area inspections are reasona-
ble,87 the Camara court held that" 'probable cause' to issue a 
warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or admin-
istrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satis-
fied with respect to a particular dwelling. "88 The Court further 
noted that such administrative or legislative standards "will not 
necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of 
the particular dwelling."89 
The Camara balancing test has been applied in many con-
texts. In Terry v. Ohio,90 the Supreme Court determined the 
reasonableness of a police officer's stop and frisk of a suspect by 
balancing the need to search against the invasion the search en-
tailed.91 The Terry court stated that for a search to be reasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment, it must be "justified at its 
inception,"92 and "reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place. "93 The 
court determined that the stop of a robbery suspect could be 
justified at its inception only when an officer had a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal intent based on particularized, articulable 
facts. 94 The court found that an officer's frisk is reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances when the frisk is limited to a 
patdown of the man's outer garments.9Ci 
The two-prong Terry test of reasonableness has been ap-
plied by the Supreme Court in various contexts, among which 
are searches of schoolchildren,96 and the search of public em-
ployees by their public employers.97 In both cases, the Court 
87. [d. at 538. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. 
90. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality 
of a police officer's stop and frisk of a suspect without probable cause. [d. at 7. The 
Court concluded, after balancing the government interest in law enforcement against the 
individual's private expectations of privacy, that police officers have a narrow authority 
to search for weapons when they have a reasonably articulable suspicion that the suspect 
presents a danger to the officer or third parties. [d. at 27. 
91. [d. at 21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35). 
92. [d. at 20. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 27. 
95. [d. at 29. 
96. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
97. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987). 
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tested the balance of competing governmental and individual in-
terests by analyzing whether a search was justified at its incep-
tion and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the intrusion. As the Ninth Circuit summarized it in 
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, "finding a search 
justified at its inception requires a determination that there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
the evidence sought. "98 For a search to be permissible in scope, 
it must be reasonably related to the objective of the search, and 
not excessively intrusive.99 
The Seventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of 
drug and alcohol testing of bus drivers in Division 241 Amalga-
mated Transit Union v. SuscylOO In a case whose facts parallel 
those of Burnley, the Seventh Circuit decided that transit au-
thority rules requiring mandatory blood and urine testing of bus 
drivers involved in serious accident, or drivers suspected of be-
ing intoxicated by drugs or alcohol, met the Fourth Amend-
ment's standard of reasonableness. lol In a brief decision, the 
court applied the balancing test of Camara v. Municipal 
Court,t°2 and balanced the interests of the public in safe bus op-
eration against the privacy interest of the bus drivers regarding 
the information contained in their blood and urine. lOS The Sev-
enth Circuit found that in light of the public's interest in safety, 
the drivers could "have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
with regard to submitting to blood and urine tests."I04 
The Fifth Circuit applied a balancing test of reasonableness 
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,t°6 which 
is being considered by the Supreme Court as a companion case 
to Burnley. That case involved a Customs Service program re-
98. 839 F.2d at 587. 
99.Id. 
100. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976). In this case, the Seventh Circuit decided the 
constitutionality of transit authority rules requiring bus drivers to submit to blood or 
urine tests following their involvement in a serious crash. Id. at 1266. The court held 
that in light of the government interest in public safety, the bus drivers had no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy regarding the blood and urine tests. Id. at 1267 (citing U.S. v. 
Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959.) 
101. Id. 
102. 387 U.S. at 534-35. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
103. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267. 
104. Id. 
105. 816 F.2d 170 (1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1072 (1988). 
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quiring urine tests for drug use of customs workers seeking pro-
motion into sensitive positions.l06 
The Fifth Circuit weighed such factors as justification for 
the search, scope and manner, place, voluntariness, and the ad-
ministrative nature of the search. l07 The court found that the 
Customs Service, as an agency charged with interdicting the flow 
of illegal drugs into the United States had a strong interest in 
ensuring that its employees are not using illegal drugs them-
selves. l08 While the court found that urinalysis is a search, the 
court did not find it as intrusive as blood tests, home searches, 
strip searches, or body cavity searches. l09 Finding that on bal-
ance the government's interest in the integrity of its customs 
workers outweighed the workers' reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy, the court upheld the urinalysis program.110 
The court analogized its balancing analysis to the rationale 
of the closely regulated industry exception to the warrant re-
quirement.lll The court noted that in the case of the warrantless 
search of closely regulated industries, the balance is between the 
necessity of accomplishing the regulatory scheme, and the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy of those involved in the 
industry.ll2 
The Von Raab court specifically analyzed the level of indi-
vidual suspicion necessary to make the search constitutional.1l3 
The court noted that while "some quantum of individualized 
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or 
seizure ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible re-
quirement of such suspicion."ll. The Fifth Circuit further noted 
that at times the balance of interests makes it imposssible to 
insist upon "some quantum of individualized suspicion. "lllI After 
106. [d. at 172. 
107. [d. at 177-81. 
108. [d. at 178. 
109. [d. at 177. 
110. [d. at 180. 
111. [d. at 179. 
112. [d. at 180. 
113. [d. at 176. 
114. [d. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)). 
115. [d. at 176-77 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 
(1976). 
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its consideration of all of the circumstances, the court decided 
that the Customs Service program could proceed without a re-
quirement of individualized suspicion.118 
4. Express and Implied Consent to Searches 
A search may be conducted without a warrant or probable 
cause if the subject of the search consents to it. ll7 The validity 
of the given consent is measured by whether it was voluntary 
under the totality of the circumstances.118 In certain circum-
stances, consent to a search can be implied from a person's deci-
sion to continue certain activities.119 In the case of participation 
in closely regulated industries, the Supreme Court has said that 
"[T]he businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to 
the restrictions placed upon him." 120 
But finding that implied consent to a search has been given 
is limited by the nature of the search consented to.121 If a search 
has been determined to be constitutionally unreasonable, con-
sent to it will not make it constitutionally valid.122 Further, con-
116. [d. at 180. 
117. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, the de-
fendant was stopped by a police officer for driving a car with only one headlight and a 
burned-out license plate light. [d. at 220. After five of the six men in the car could not 
produce identification, the officer asked for permission to search the car, which was 
granted. [d. The court held that the voluntariness of consent given to a search is a fact to 
be determined from all of the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right 
to refuse is a factor in the balance, it is not an element to be proven by the prosecution. 
[d. at 248-49. 
118. [d. at 248-49. 
119. See LAFAVE, supra note 27, § 8.2(1). 
120. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973). In this case, the 
defendant was stopped by the Border Patrol 25 air miles north of the Mexican border. 
[d. at 268. The government argued that the stop was justified without probable cause 
under the administrative search rationale of Camara. [d. at 270. The Supreme Court 
distinguished the Border Patrol's stop from the administrative inspection cases on the 
ground that in the latter cases, "[t)he businessman in a regulated industry in effect con-
sents to the restrictions placed on him." [d. at 271. The Court held that the warrantless 
search of the defendant's car without probable cause could not be justified as a border 
search Id. at 273. 
121. See LAFAVE, supra note 27, at § 8.2(1). 
122. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). Federal employees' unions sued to enjoin the implementation of a mandatory 
urinalysis drug-testing program for certain civilian employees. [d. at 937. The court held 
that "a search otherwise unreasonable cannot be redeemed by a public employer's exac-
tion of a 'consent' to the search as a condition of employment." [d. at 943. See also: 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); and McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 
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sent to unreasonable searches "is not a reasonable condition of 
employment. "123 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. The Majority 
1. Blood, Urine and Breath Tests Are Searches 
The Ninth Circuit began its Fourth Amendment analysis of 
the regulations at issue with the threshhold questions of whether 
the blood, urine and breath tests mandated were searches for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, and whether the government ac-
tion requirement was met.12. 
In asking whether or not a railroad worker has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the "personal information contained in 
his body fiuids,"1211 the court first noted that Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia 126 had clearly decided that blood tests are searches for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.127 The court further 
pointed out that every court that had considered the issue had 
decided that urine tests for the purpose of discovering drug or 
alcohol use were searches under the Fourth Amendment.12s On 
the issue of breath testing, the court cited Shoemaker v. Han-
del129 for the rule that breath tests qualify as searches. 
Having determined that the Fourth Amendment applied to 
the blood, urine and breath tests that would be implemented by 
the private railroad industry,130 the court began its inquiry into 
1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1987). 
123. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa. 1985). 
124. Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 579-80 (9th 
Cir. 1988). 
125. [d. at 580. 
126. 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). See discussion in note 44, supra. 
127. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 580. 
128. Id. See, e.g.: Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National 
Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1987); and McDon-
ell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987). 
129. 795 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 577 (1986). 
130. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 580-81. In deciding the question of whether there was 
sufficient government involvement in the drug and alcohol testing contemplated to bring 
the private railroads' actions under the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit relied on 
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973) In Davis, the court evaluated 
16
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the correct standard of reasonableness to apply to the 
searches. lSI 
Noting that as a general rule warrants are required to make 
searches reasonable,132 the court analyzed whether a warrant 
should be required in the case at hand. l3S The court began its 
analysis by noting that while a warrant is generally required to 
make searches reasonable, "it is not the sine qua non of reasona-
bleness."ls. In situations of "special need" warrants may be dis-
pensed with.13II The court noted that in the case of administra-
tive searches of closely regulated industries, searches of public 
employers, searches of schoolchildren by school administrators, 
and blood tests incident to drunk driving arrests, the warrant 
requirement has clearly been eliminated. ISS Deciding that the ra-
tionale of "special need"ls7 applied because of "the exigencies of 
testing for the presence of alcohol and drugs in blood, urine or 
breath,"ls8 the court concluded that the drug and alcohol tests 
called for by the regulations would not require a warrant in or-
der to be constitutional.189 
the government action requirement with respect to airport security searches conducted 
by private airline workers. [d. at 896. Finding that federal officials had "conceived, di-
rected, and implemented" the airport search program [d. at 897, the court decided that 
the government's involvement was significant enough to involve the Fourth Amende-
ment. [d. at 904. 
Applying the significant involvement test of Davis to the railroads' actions, the court 
found that the Federal Railroad Administration's involvement in creating the rules and 
overseeing their implementation "clearly amounts to significant involvement for Fourth 
amendment purposes." Burnley, 839 F.2d at 581. The court further noted that in the 
context of President Reagan's Executive Order for a "Drug-Free Federal Workplace," 
Exec. Order No. 12,564, 561 Fed.Reg. 32,889 (1986). the FRA regulations could not be 
viewed "as anything less than part of an overall, nationwide anti-drug campaign." Burn-
ley, 839 F.2d at 582. 
131. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 582. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. 
135. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See 
supra, note 47 for discussion of the case. 
136. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 583, citing New York v. Burger, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987); 
(administrative searches); O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987); New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (see supra note 47 for a discus-
sion of the case); and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (see supra note 44 for 
a discussion of the case). 
137. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
138. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 583. 
139. [d. at 582-83. 
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Despite the court's conclusion that the tests would not re-
quire a warrant, the Ninth Circuit did not agree with the district 
court that the closely regulated industry exception to the war-
rant requirement applied in this case, or that the case fell within 
any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement previously set 
out by the Supreme Court. HO 
2. Applicability of the Closely Regulated Industry Exception to 
the Warrant Requirement 
In the most recent case to discuss the closely regulated in-
dustry exception, In the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
"warrant and probable cause requirements which fulfill the 
traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness have 
lessened application in the context of a closely regulated indus-
try because the owner or operator. . has a reduced expectation 
of privacy."u2 
The critical fact for the Ninth Circuit in deciding the appli-
cability of the closely regulated industry exception to the regula-
tions at issue was the reasonable expectation of privacy of the 
workers that were to be the object of the testing. us 
Faced with the question of the applicability of the adminis-
trative search exception to the search of persons as opposed to 
the property of a closely regulated business, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to extend the exception to cover the search of persons 
employed in the business. I .. The court reasoned that while the 
history of close regulation of the railroad industry had dimin-
ished the reasonable expectations of privacy of the owners and 
managers of railroads with respect to the railroad premises, the 
railroad workers' reasonable expectations of privacy with regard 
to their bodily fluids has not been diminished by the regulations 
on the industry.l4II The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the vast 
bulk of safety legislation has been directed at the owners and 
managers of the railroads. By this, the court meant that the in-
140. [d. at 583-84. 
141. New York v. Burger, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987) 
142. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 584 (citing Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 2643). 
143. [d. at 584-85. 
144. [d. at 585. 
145. [d. 
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spections up to the date of the drug and alcohol testing regula-
tions in this case have been directed at the physical premises 
and stock of the railroads. as 
In order to further distinguish its decision from the Third 
Circuit's decision in Shoemaker v. Handel/,n the court empha-
sized that in the case of the railroad industry, as opposed to the 
horse-racing industry, the "sanctions and penalties for violations 
of the regulations fall on the owners and managers, not their 
employees. "148 
The court noted that in Shoemaker, a critical fact for the 
Third Circuit was that the jockeys and other race-track employ-
ees were the principal concern of the industry regulations. as As 
the Shoemaker court pointed out, the New Jersey Racing Com-
mission had "exercised its rulemaking authority in ways that 
have reduced the justifiable privacy expectations of persons en-
gaged in the horse-racing industry."UG 
Railroad safety regulations, in the eyes of the Ninth Circuit, 
have not put the railroad workers on notice that "their partici-
pation in the industry reduces their legitimate expections of pri-
vacy in the integrity of their bodies."1111 The court concluded 
that the warrantless searches under the closely regulated indus-
try exception could not take place when employees are not the 
"principal concern of the industry regulation."l&2 
3. The Balancing Test of Reasonableness 
To determine the standard of reasonableness applicable to 
146. Id. 
147. 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986). See supra note 
66 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
148. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 585. 
149. Id. 
150. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. The Ninth Circuit contrasted the Shoemaker 
facts with those of the railroad industry: jockeys are licensed, but railroad workers are 
not; jockeys' job qualifications are determined by government regulation, but the govern-
ment is precluded from setting railroad workers' job qualifications; other governmental 
regulations in the field of horseracing are directed at the condition of employees, but in 
the railroad industry other government regulations apply only to the maintenance of 
equipment and facilities. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 585. 
151. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 585. 
152. Id. 
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the drug and alcohol tests at issue, the Ninth Circuit used the 
Camaralr,s balancing test, which balances the government's in-
terest in the search against the level of intrusion into the indi-
viduals reasonable expectation of privacy.lr,4 
As the court analyzed it, on one side of the balance was the 
employees' reasonable expectations of privacy, and on the other 
side, the government's interest in safe railroad operation. m The 
court decided that probable cause was not necessary for the 
search to be constitutional, us but that the search must be rea-
sonable "under all of the circumstances of the search. "Ir,7 
4. The Two-Pronged Test of Reasonable Searches 
To apply the resonableness standard, the court adopted the 
two-prong test set out in Terry v. Ohio:lr,s (1) that the search 
was justified at its inception; and (2) that the search was reason-
ably related in scope to the facts justifying the intrusion into the 
individual's privacy. us To find a search justified at its inception, 
a court must determine that there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will yield the evidence sought. ISO 
The Federal Railroad Administration argued that the Su-
preme Court and the Ninth Circuit had previously found 
searches justified at their inception where there was neither 
probable cause nor individualized suspicion. lSI The Ninth Cir-
153. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The Ninth Circuit cited 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. at 1499, which is a later statement of the Camara balanc-
ing test. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 586. See supra note 65, and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the Camara balancing test. 
154. Burnley 839 F.2d at 587. 
155. Id. at 586. 
156. Id. at 587. 
157. Id. 
158. 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). See supra notes 90-95, and accompanying text. 
159. Id. 
160. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587. 
161. Id. at 586. The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have previously approved 
searches of persons without probable cause or individualized suspicion. Id. The Federal 
Railroad Administration discussed United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) 
(which upheld brief vehicle stops at checkpoints); United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 
499 (9th Cir. 1984) (which upheld pat-down searches at a border crossing with only mini-
mal suspicion), partially vacated 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985) ; and McMorris v. Alioto, 
567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978) (which legitimized routine metal detector and pat-down 
searches of attorneys and others entering courthouses in San Francisco). 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/5
1989] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 
cuit distinguished those cases from Burnley by noting that while 
a vital government interest has been held to justify minimal in-
trusions into the privacy of individuals without probable cause 
or individualized suspicion,ls2 the tests in issue could not be con-
sidered minimal intrusions.lsa 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has not 
yet determined whether individualized or particularized suspi-
cion is necessarily required for there to be reasonable grounds of 
suspecting that a search will produce the evidence sought. IS. The 
Ninth Circuit found it significant that in the cases of school 
searches and public employee searches, property, not persons, 
was the object of the search and individualized suspicion did 
exist. lslI 
The Ninth Circuit held that particularized suspicion is nec-
essary to find the search of railroad workers for drug or alcohol 
intoxication justified at its inception. ISS The court decided that 
accidents or rule violations in themselves, do not create "reason-
able grounds for suspecting that tests will demonstrate alcohol 
or drug impairment in anyone railroad employee, much less an 
entire train crew."lS7 The court buttressed its holding by point-
ing to the Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,tsS 
which noted that "[E]xceptions to the requirement of individu-
alized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy 
interests implicated by the search are minimal. . . . "lse Because 
blood and urine tests are more than minimal intrusions, the 
court held that the testing provisions are unreasonable searches 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.17o 
Despite its decision that the tests were not justified at their 
inception, the court went on to analyze whether the tests were 
reasonably related in scope to the interests that justified the 
162. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 586. 
163. [d. 
164. [d. at 587. 
165. [d. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985); see also 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. at 1503 (1987). 
166. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587. 
167. [d. 
168. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
169. [d. at 342 n.8. 
170. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 588. 
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searches in the first place.171 The standard applied by the court 
was whether or not the tests were excessively intrusive in light of 
the objectives of the search.172 The court applied this standard 
to the regulations "as they would stand with particularized sus-
picion incorporated as a necessary predicate to all testing."173 
The Burnley court noted that the purpose of the regulations 
was to detect current drug intoxication. Through the deterrent 
effect of testing the regulations would improve railroad safety.17. 
According to the court, the one flaw in the approach taken is the 
"[B]lood and urine tests intended to establish drug use other 
than alcohol are not reasonably related to the stated purpose 
. . . because the tests cannot measure current drug intoxication 
or degree of impairment."1711 The court noted that drug tests of 
the type to be administered by the railroads cannot distinguish 
current intoxication from the physiological after-effects of drug 
use weeks or months prior to the testing.176 
However, in light of the great government interest in rail-
road safety, the court decided that if individualized suspicion 
was a prerequisite for such drug testing, the regulations would 
be reasonably related in scope because "the combination of ob-
servable symptoms of impairment with a positive result on a 
drug test would provide a sound basis for appropriate discipli-
nary action."177 
5. The Court's Analysis of Other Circuit Courts' Decisions 
The Burnley court concluded its Fourth Amendment analy-
sis by distinguishing its reasoning and conclusion from recent 
decisions in other circuits upholding drug and alcohol testing.178 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 589. 
177. Id. The court briefly analyzed whether the government's argument that the im-
plied consent provision in DOT Control of Alcohol and Drug Use, 49 C.F.R. § 219.11 
(1987), satisfied the Fourth Amendment even under the test of reasonable suspicion, and 
found that when a search is constitutionally unreasonable, consent to it cannot validate 
it.ld. 
178. Id. at 589-90. 
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The court distinguished the Fifth Circuit's decision in National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab179 by noting that the 
Von Raab court had failed to consider whether drug tests of cus-
toms workers were justified at their inception.180 The court dis-
tinguished the Eighth Circuit's decision to uphold random 
urinalysis of prison employees in McDonell. v. Hunter18l on two 
grounds. First, that the Eighth Circuit failed to find the tests 
justified at their inception,182 and second, that Eighth Circuit's 
view that urinalysis was a minor intrusion was incorrect.183 
The court reiterated its criticism of the Shoemaker184 
court's reliance on the closely regulated industry exception to 
the warrant requirement. 1811 The court distinguished the factu-
ally similar Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. 
Suscy188 by noting that the Seventh Circuit's decision was not 
based on an analysis of whether the tests were justified at their 
inception.187 
The court concluded its analysis by briefly considering and 
rejecting RLEA's statutory and other constitutional 
arguments.188 
179. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987). 
180. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 590. 
181. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987). 
182. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 590. See supra note 35 for a discussion of this case. 
183. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 590. 
184. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3rd Cir.), eert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 
577 (1986). 
185. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 590. See supra notes 100-104, and accompanying text for 
a discussion of Susey. 
186. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976). 
187. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587. 
188. ld. at 590-92. The first statutory argument raised by RLEA was that the regu-
lations violated the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. §§ 431-440 (1982» 
because the FRA lacked the authority to delegate testing to the railroads, and to permit 
testing without individualized suspicion. ld. at 590-91. The court concluded that the ar-
gument was meritless because 45 U.S.C. § 437(a) authorizes the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to delegate functions respecting examination, inspection and testing of employees to 
qualified individuals. ld. at 590. 
RLEA also argued that under Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (a case 
that held that OSHA inspections must be conducted pursuant to a warrant), any statu-
tory scheme mandating warrantless searches was unconstitutional. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 
590. The court dismissed this argument because the Marshall court had been specifically 
concerned with OSHA searches, and because the decision in that case had stated that 
the "reasonableness of a warrantless search . . . will depend upon the specific enforce-
ment needs and privacy guarantees of each statute." ld. at 591 (quoting Marshall v. 
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978». 
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B. THE DISSENT 
Circuit Judge Alarcon's dissent first focused on the applica-
bility of the closely regulated industry exception.189 He dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the laws regulating 
the railroad industry were not aimed in large part at railroad 
workers.190 The dissent noted that Congress set limits on work-
ing hours,19l mandated safe working practices by railroad per-
sonnel,t92 and set out criminal sanctions for certain rule viola-
RLEA's argument that the regulations violate the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-94 (1982), by discrimination against the handicapped was dis-
missed by the court because the FRA regulations do not mandate discriminatory treat-
ment of workers handicapped by drug or alcohol addictions. [d. The court also pointed 
out that the rehabilitation act does not cover alcoholics or drug abusers whose use of the 
substances endangers public safety 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). Burnley, 839 F.2d at 
591. 
The last statutory argument by RLEA was that the regulations violated the Railway 
Labor Act (45 U.S.C. §§ 151 (1982» by denying employees the right to union representa-
tion at the testing procedures. [d. Because the regulations are silent regarding the em-
ployee's right to representation, the court concluded that the question was not ripe for 
review. [d. 
RLEA also argued that the regulations infringed on the railroad workers' fundamen-
tal rights of privacy guaranteed by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Burnley, 839 F.2d 
at 591. The Ninth Circuit did not find that Roe had been extended far enough by the 
Supreme Court to cover any right to choose use of drugs or alcohol. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 
591. However, the court pointed out that in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the 
Supreme Court discussed the right to keep information about drug use private. Burnley, 
839 F.2d at 591. Pointing to Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 
107 S.Ct. 577 (1986), the Ninth Circuit noted that one factor concerning the reasonable-
ness of the drug tests in that case was the guaranteee of confidentiality within the statu-
tory scheme. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 592. Although the FRA regulations contained no such 
guarantee of confidentiality, the court concluded that the issue should be litigated and 
decided after a breach of confidentiality. [d. 
RLEA also argued that the regulations violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment by mandating the testing of covered employees but not supervisory 
employees. [d. Noting that the Equal Protection Clause in this situation required only a 
rational relationship between the classification scheme and a legitimate government ob-
jective, the court concluded that because the covered workers were those actually operat-
ing the trains, the regulation's provisions were reasonably related to the government goal 
of safe railroad operation. [d. 
189. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 590-92 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
190. [d. at 593 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
191. 45 U.S.C. § 62(a)(1) (1982). 
192. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 593 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon noted 49 
C.F.R. § 218.1-218.30 (1986) (requiring certain safety procedures); 49 C.F.R. § 218.37 
(1986) (requiring certain safety procedures when trains were running at reduced speeds); 
and 49 C.F.R. § 220.61 (1986) (requiring certain safety practices when orders were given 
or received). 
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tions.193 The dissent concluded that railroad workers have a 
diminished expectation of privacy with respect to their use of 
drugs or alcohol.194 Judge Alarcon pointed to the fact that for a 
considerable period of time railroad workers have been subject 
to Rule G,t911 a rule adopted by the railroad industry which pro-
hibits the use of alcoholic or controlled substances by employees 
"subject to duty or while on dutY,"196 and which requires urine 
or blood tests to clear workers of suspicion of drug or alcohol 
use.197 
Because railroad workers themselves have a history of close 
regulation, Judge Alarcon concluded that the closely regulated 
industry exception applied to the disputed drug and alcohol 
testing.19s 
Having concluded that the exception applied in this case, 
the dissent then applied the three-prong test of reasonableness 
for searches of closely regulated industries set out by the Su-
preme Court in New York v. Burger.199 
Judge Alarcon concluded that the first prong of Burger was 
met because there was a substantial government interest inform-
ing the regulatory scheme because fatal accidents have been re-
corded that occurred due to drug or alcohol use by railroad per-
sonnel. 200 The government also has a substantial interest in 
protecting citizens from accidents involving toxic chemicals and 
the other hazardous materials carried by train.20l 
The dissent concluded that the second prong of Burger was 
met because warrantless inspections are necessary to accomplish 
the regulatory purpose. Prompt action is required to gather sam-
193. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 593. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon cited 49 
U.S.C. § 1801 (1982) (providing criminal penalties for knowing transportation of hazard-
ous material); and 45 U.S.C. § 438 (1982) (setting out criminal penalties for false entries 
in accident reports.) Burnley, 839 F.2d at 593. 
194. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 593 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
195. Rule G was adopted on April 17, 1897, by the Association of American Rail-
roads into its Standard Code of Operating Rules. 
196. See infra note 225, for the text of Rule G. 
197. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 593 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
198. [d. at 598 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
199. 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987). See supra note 45, for a discussion of Burger. 
200. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 596 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
201. [d. at 594 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
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pIes before the body breaks down the drugs or alcohol in the 
bloodstream.202 
The dissent concluded that the third prong of the Burger 
test was met because the testing procedures set out in the regu-
lations were triggered by objective circumstances (major acci-
dents or fatal incidents) and therefore the tests were not being 
given at the discretion of anyone official.2°s 
Stating that the blood and urine testing program satisfied 
the Burger test of reasonableness, Judge Alarcon concluded that 
the regulations were constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. 204 
Judge Alarcon found an alternative ground of constitution-
ality in the balancing test of reasonableness that originated in 
Camara u. Municipal Court20r, and which became a two-fold test 
in Terry u. Ohio.206 
The first part of the Terry test requires a court to deter-
mine whether the search is "justified at its inception,"207 by bal-
ancing "the need to search against the invasion that the search 
entails."208 On the government side of the scale the dissent 
placed the government's "compelling need to ensure that railway 
employees be free of alcohol or controlled substances in propel-
ling locomotives across this nation,"209 and on the workers' side 
of the scale the intrusion caused by the blood, urine and breath 
tests.21O The dissent concluded that the government's need out-
weighed the invasion of the railroad workers' privacy inter-
ests.211 Judge Alarcon pointed to the conclusions drawn by the 
other Circuits whose decisions were discussed by the majority.212 
202. Id. 
203. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
204. Id. at 595 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
205. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See supra note 64, and accompanying text. 
206. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra note 90, and accompanying text. 
207. Finding a search "justified at its inception" is the first prong of the two-prong 
test of reasonableness set out in Terry v. Ohio, Id. at 20. 
208. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 595 (Alarcon, J., dissenting), (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21.) 
209. Id. at 596 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 595-97 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
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The dissent also stated that it could be presumed that the work-
ers were aware that they would be subject to inquiry regarding 
their use of controlled substances and alcohol because of the ex-
istence of Rule G.213 
Satisfaction of the second-prong of the Terry test requires 
that the tests are reasonably related to the search objectives.2H 
The dissent concluded that the tests were reasonably related to 
the search objectives. This conclusion was based on the fact that 
safeguards built into the regulations address the overbreadth 
problem presented by urine tests revealing past as well as cur-
rent intoxication.2111 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Railway Labor Executives' 
Ass'n v. Burnley rests upon the court's analysis of the applica-
bility of the closely regulated industry exception to the warrant 
and probable cause requirement for searches, and on the court's 
holding that individualized suspicion is required to find a search 
justified at its inception.216 
A. CLOSELY REGULATED INDUSTRY EXCEPTION 
The Ninth Circuit held that the closely regulated industry 
exception does not apply to the searches of workers in closely 
regulated industries unless the workers have been the "principal 
concern"217 of the regulatory scheme. This holding makes it nec-
essary for courts to make factual analyses of whether an indus-
try's regulations are principally concerned with the premises, 
stock, and machinery of the industry, or the workers in the in-
dustry. But reasonable minds may interpret the "object" of a 
213. [d. at 595. 
214. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
215. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 597 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Alarcon noted that 49 
C.F.R. § 219.309(b)(2) (1987) requires the railroads to inform tested workers of the over-
breadth problem presented by urine tests, and to counsel them to take a blood test that 
will accurately determine whether the drugs detected in their blood were taken recently 
or not. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 597. 
216. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 587 (9th Cir.1988), 
cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 2033 (1988). 
217. [d. at 585. 
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regulatory scheme in various ways. Here, for example, the major-
ity contends that the object of the railroad industry's regulations 
are the premises, management and rolling stock,U8 while the dis-
sent forcefully argues that railroad workers have been important 
objects of regulations diminishing their reasonable expectations 
of privacy.us 
The court's effort to distinguish its decision from Shoe-
maker220 serves to undermine the strength of its argument that 
the closely regulated industry exception applies to property not 
persons. The Ninth Circuit's holding implicitly adopts the Shoe-
maker court's ruling that in certain cases the workers in closely 
regulated industries can be searched under the closely regulated 
industry warrant exception.221 The court did not decide that the 
closely regulated industry exception has no application at all to 
the search of persons working in a closely regulated industry. 
The court simply held that such workers can be searched with-
out a warrant under that exception only where, as in Shoe-
maker, they have been the principal object of the industry 
regulations. 
An analysis of the applicability of the closely regulated in-
dustry exception to the search of persons as well as business 
premises must focus on the rationale and limits of the founda-
tion case of the administrative search doctrine, Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court.222 
The Supreme Court in Camara noted three critical factors 
that justified administrative searches without particularized sus-
picion or probable cause.223 The first factor was that "such pro-
grams have a long history of judicial and public acceptance."224 
As applied to Burnley, the argument can be made that while the 
particular drug testing program in issue was only recently en-
acted, the railroad industry and its workers have been subject to 
218. ld. 
219. ld. at 593-94 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
220. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 
(1986). 
221. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. 
222. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
223. ld. at 537. 
224. ld. 
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rules regarding alcohol and drug use for a long period of time.22Ii 
The second Camara factor required the existence of a strong 
public interest.228 Applied to the railroad's testing scheme, a 
strong argument can be made that the public interest in safety 
demands that trains be operated by sober workers. Today's 
trains carry potentially dangerous cargo such as toxic chemicals 
and radioactive wastes, as well as hundreds of passengers. The 
nature of society's drug and alcohol problem is such that testing 
may be the best means available to protect the public. 
The critical element is the Camara court's third factor; that 
"because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor 
aimed at the discovery of crime, they involve a relatively limited 
invasion of the ... citizen's privacy."227 The application of the 
closely regulated industry exception to the searches of the work-
ers in an industry must be seen in light of the fact that the 
Camara court's authorization of the search of housing based on 
only generalized suspicion was founded on the rationale that the 
invasion involved was only minimal. 228 
One issue the Supreme Court may resolve is whether limits 
set by the Camara court's third factor preclude the type of ap-
plication of the closely regulated industry exception that has 
been made in Shoemaker v. Handel. 229 In that case, the Third 
Circuit held that a warrantless administrative search of jockeys 
for drug or alcohol use was justified when there was a strong 
state interest in searching and when pervasive regulation of an 
industry has reduced the justifiable expectations of privacy of 
the workers in that industry.z8o The Shoemaker court's require-
225. For over 40 years, the railroad workers represented by RLEA have been subject 
to Rule G, which presently states: 
The use of alcoholic beverages, intoxicants, narcotics, mari-
juana, or other controlled substances by employees subject to 
duty, or their possession or use while on duty or on company 
property is prohibited. Employees must not report for duty 
under the influence of any marijuana, or other controlled sub-
stances, or medication, including those prescribed by a doctor, 
that may in any way adversely affect their alertness, coordina-
tion, reaction, response or safety. 
226. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. 
227. Id. Emphasis added. 
228. Id. at 535. 
229. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986). 
230. Id. at 1142. 
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ments for drug and alcohol testing under the closely regulated 
industry exception has been recently applied in Rushton v. Ne-
braska Public Power District,231 a case involving the drug and 
alcohol testing of workers at a nuclear power plant. 
Both the Shoemaker and Rushton courts emphasized that 
the workers had diminished expectations of privacy given the 
nature of their employment. It is this reduced expectation of 
privacy that is critical in evaluating whether the searches of per-
sons under the administrative search exception is a "limited in-
vasion"282 for the purpose of the third Camara factor. 
The majority of the Ninth Circuit held that "[R]ailroad 
safety regulations have not put railroad employees on notice 
that their participation in the industry reduces their legitimate 
expectations of privacy in the integrity of their bodies."288 But 
Judge Alarcon in dissent concluded that train operators "should 
... be presumed to know that inquiry concerning their off-duty 
drug and alcohol use is likely because of the danger to others 
that would flow from operating a train while under the influence 
of such substances. "284 
In the context of prior regulation of drug and alcohol use by 
the railroads,2811 the dissent's position is persuasive. It is reasona-
ble to conclude that the railroad workers' expectations of pri-
vacy have been lowered by their work in the heavily regulated 
railroad industry. There is a strong case for the Supreme Court 
to conclude that the invasion caused by the drug and alcohol 
testing is minimal and in keeping with the limits and rationale 
of Camara. 
231. 653 F.Supp. 1510 (D.Neb. 1987). In this case, the federal district court was 
faced with a Fourth Amendment challenge to the Nebraska Public Power District's regu-
lation implementing a fitness-for-duty scheme of drug and alcohol testing. [d. at 1512 
The court applied the test set out in Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d at 1142. The court 
decided that the rules were constitutional because the Nebraska Public Power District's 
compelling interest in safety outweighed the privacy interest of the nuclear power plant 
workers. Rushton, 653 F.Supp. at 1525. 
232. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
233. Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 585 (9th Cir.), 
cert. granted 108 S.Ct. 2033 (1988).Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 
575, 585 (9th Cir.), cert. granted 108 S.Ct. 2033 (1988). 
234. [d. at 595 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). See supra note 225 for the text of Rule G. 
235. See supra note 225. 
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If the Supreme Court decides that the closely regulated in-
dustry exception does apply, the reasonableness of the regula-
tions will be evaluated by the three-prong test set out in New 
York u. Burger.286 As the dissent in Burnley argued,2S7 the "sub-
stantial government interest"288 prong is met because of the 
great need for safe rail operation.289 The requirement that the 
warrantless inspections are necessary to further the regulatory 
scheme is met because of the exigencies involved with toxicologi-
cal testing.240 The final requirement that the certainty and regu-
larity of the inspection program prevents overreaching by offi-
cials is met because the regulations require either an objective 
triggering event like a major accident, or the reasonable suspi-
cion of two trained supervisors.241 
B. BALANCING TEST OF REASONABLENESS 
1. Is the Search "Justified at Its Inception"? 
The central issue in an analysis of whether the drug and 
alcohol tests are reasonable under a balancing test' is whether 
individualized suspicion should be required to find that the 
search is justified at its inception. 
To find a search justified at its inception, there must be rea-
sonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up the 
evidence sought.242 The Ninth Circuit held that "[A]ccidents, in-
cidents or rule violations, by themselves, do not create reasona-
ble grounds for suspecting . . . "248 and held that particularized 
suspicion is essential to finding toxicological testing of railroad 
employees justified at its inception.244 
The Supreme Court has stated that while "individualized 
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or 
seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible re-
236. 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987). 
237. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 594 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
238. Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 2644. See, Burnley, 839 F.2d at 594. 
239. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 594 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
240. [d. 
241. [d. 
242. [d. at 587. 
243. [d. 
244. [d. 
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quirement of such suspicion."2u The Court has noted, however, 
that "[E]xceptions to the requirement of individualized suspi-
cion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests 
implicated by a search are minimal and where 'other safeguards' 
are available 'to assure that the individual'~ reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy is not "subject to the discretion of the official in 
the field." , "246 
In view of this qualification by the Supreme Court regarding 
the appropriateness of searches without individualized suspicion, 
the level of intrusion caused by the drug and alcohol testing be-
comes a critical factor. As discussed above, there is a strong ar-
gument that railroad workers have a diminished expectation of 
privacy. If the workers do have a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy, it is possible to conclude that the required blood, breath 
and urine tests are minimal intrusions. As minimal intrusions, it 
is arguable that individualized suspicion is not necessary to 
make the search justified at its inception.247 
2. Scope of the Search 
A factor that was not considered by the Ninth Circuit re-
garding the intrusiveness of the tests called for by the regula-
tions is the possibility that the information gleaned from the 
tests will be used as evidence in the criminal prosecution of the 
245. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976). 
246. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n. 8. (1985) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)). 
247. Some commentators who have considered this balance have concluded that 
workers in closely regulated industries whose jobs impact on the public good are subject 
to drug and alcohol testing under a lesser standard than individualized suspicion. Book-
span, Behind Open Doors, Constitutional Implications of Government Employee Drug 
Testing, 11 NOVA L.REV. 307, 342-43, note 177 (1987). 
Professor LaFave has written the following on this subject: 
[sJuch a testing program will most likely pass muster if it 
serves the interest of protecting public safety, or where the na-
ture of the private employee's job is such that inadequate per-
formance of it because of drug use would present such a dan-
ger of property or personal damage to some member of the 
public ... 
LAFAVE, supra note 27 at 32 (Supp. 1988). 
See Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing, 48 U. PI'IT. L. REV. 201 (1986). Regarding the 
FRA regulations at issue in Burnley, Miller wrote that the "FRA regulations are exam-
ples of ways in which the protection afforded public employers through the Fourth 
Amendment can be extended to private sector employees .... " Id. at 240 
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railroad workers who test positive following a major accident.2'8 
This possibility of criminal sanction may constitute a severe 
enough invasion of privacy to warrant the requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion.249 
C. CONFLICT WITH THE OTHER CIRCUITS 
The Ninth Circuit has boldly made individualized suspicion 
the precondition for constitutional drug and alcohol testing. 2~O 
The other circuits that have considered the issue have held that 
particularized suspicion is not a prerequisite to a constitutional 
drug and alcohol testing scheme. m 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the reasonableness of such 
toxicological testing differs from the analysis done by these 
other circuits because of the Ninth Circuit's insistence that for a 
search to be reasonable, it must be "justified at its inception. "2~2 
As set out in O'Connor v. Ortega,m for a search to be justified 
at its inception, there must be "reasonable grounds for sus-
pecting that the search will turn up the evidence sought. "2M The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that an accident or incident alone 
would not create a reasonable suspicion that drugs or alcohol 
would be found in the railroad workers' bloodstreams.m 
Alcohol and drug use is prevalent in American society. The 
248. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, (1986) mandates up to five 
years imprisonment and/or up to $10,000 fine for those operating a common carrier while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
249. See Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Georgia 1985). In consid-
ering the invasion of privacy caused by an urinalysis screening for marijuana use, the 
district court wrote: "Added to this balancing ... is the fact that government investiga-
tions of employee misconduct always carry the potential to become criminal investiga-
tions." [d. at 491. 
250. Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 587 (9th Cir.), 
cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 2033 (1988). 
251. See: National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 
1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1072 (1988); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 
1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986); 
and Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). 
252. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587, (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 
(1985)). 
253. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987). 
254. [d. at 1503. 
255. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587. 
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undisputed facts adopted by the court showed that drug and al-
cohol use by railroad workers is a serious concern of the railroad. 
Faced with a train accident, a reasonable person may very well 
expect to find evidence of drug or alcohol use by the workers 
responsible for the train. 
The other circuit courts that have considered similar testing 
schemes analyzed the justification for the searches by balancing 
the government need to search against the privacy interests of 
the individuals searched.2G6 By focusing on the initial justifica-
tion of the toxicological tests, the Ninth Circuit may have failed 
to fairly balance the interests at stake. It is certainly arguable 
that the government has a compelling interest in safeguarding 
the public from locomotives piloted by men and women im-
paired by drugs or alcohol. And as Judge Alarcon stated, work-
ers on the railroads can be presumed to know the danger, and to 
have a lesser expectation of privacy based on that presumption. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley,257 the Ninth 
Circuit held that drug and alcohol testing of railroad workers 
following certain accidents or incidents may be required or au-
thorized only when specific articulable facts give rise to a rea-
sonable suspicion that a test will reveal evidence of current drug 
or alcohol impairment.2G6 
By refusing to apply the closely regulated industry excep-
tion to the warrant to the case and by finding the search unrea-
sonable under the balancing test of reasonableness,2119 the Ninth 
Circuit has put itself in opposition to the other circuits that 
have analyzed drug and alcohol testing. 
By requiring that drug and alcohol testing regulations incor-
porate a requirement of individualized suspicion, the Ninth Cir-
256. See supra note 248. 
257. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 2033 (1988). 
258. Id. at 592. 
259. Id. at 588. 
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cuit has made it more difficult for railroads to protect their 
workers and the public from drug or alcohol induced disasters. 
John P. Pezone* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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